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I
The year 1993 is the 25th anniversary of the publication in Science
of Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons." This is probably one of
the most cited articles among social scientists in this period, and it is
surely the most reprinted. In these 25 years there have developed several
streams of theoretical work-on collective action, on repeated games, on
resource economics, on property rights and transaction costs-that have
taken us far beyond Hardin's arguments; there also has accumulated a
considerable body of empirical work (of, however, very uneven quality)
on common pool resources, whose results generally fly in the face of Hardin's conclusions; and there has been for some years a steady stream of
articles and books that make plain the errors and shortcomings of Har* Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, and University of
Washington. This paper was written while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford. Iam grateful to Center staff for help and to the National
Science Foundation for financial support (#BNS-8700864). I am also grateful to Sara Singleton for very helpful comments on a draft.
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din's article. 1 Given all this, it is extraordinary to see how often Hardin's
article is still cited as if it represented the whole truth about common pool
resources. One despairs!
Some of the developments I've referred to are reflected in the
books to be reviewed here-but not all of them. It would have been too
much to expect that they had all taken on board all the relevant theoretical
developments, but it is disappointing to see how much of this work is
ignored by every one of these books, and curiously they all speak in somewhat different languages.
Before turning to them, a very brief word on Hardin's argument
and its shortcomings. Herdsmen on a "commons," said Hardin, would
each "increase his herd without limit," because the benefit each would
derive from this would exceed the cost to him that arises from crowding
and overgrazing, the total costs of which would be shared among all the
herdsmen. The inevitable outcome was "ruin," the degradation and eventual destruction of the "commons," of the stock from which his income
derives. And the only way to avert this "tragedy" was to privatize the
"commons" or subject its users to centralized government control.
Many of Hardin's fans have liked this conclusion, since, given
that "socialism" in their eyes is obviously unacceptable, it leaves private
property-enclosing the commons-as the only solution. The argument
was and is intended to apply not only to grazing commons but to all common pool resources, including underground water and oil pools, lakes
and oceans, fisheries and wild game, forest resources, airsheds, and
indeed the whole planetary atmosphere. Getting this argument right is
clearly important.
The broad truth in Hardin's argument is of course that a resource
may be overused if there are inadequate restrictions on who has access to
it and inadequate charges or controls on those who do use it. This much
(and more) was already known.2 But in almost every detail Hardin goes
wrong. Here are, very briefly, the main problems.
(i) There is a failure to recognize common property, which is
quite distinct from open access-the situation obtaining when
there are no controls at all on access or use, in which case there
is really no property in the resource. Property (including grazing land) can be-is and always has been-held and used
jointly by a wide variety of collectivities.
1. Partha Dasgupta, after quoting a long passage from Hardin's article, writes: "It would
be difficult to locate another passage of comparable length and fame containing as many
errors as the one above." This is in The Control of Resources (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) at p. 13.
2. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery,
Journal of Political Economy, 62 (1954), 124-42; and A. Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole
Ownership,Journal of Political Economy, 63 (1955), 116-24.
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(ii) Hardin's analysis applies, if at all, to situations of open access.
But even here it is not right. Apart from the fact that it is
impossible for herdsmen to add animals to the commons
"without limit," it is costly to add any animals at all, and Hardin ignores costs altogether (apart from the shared social costs
of lowered productivity from overcrowding and overgrazing).
A user's total costs increase, of course, with additional inputadditional animals, additional and/or faster fishing boats, or
whatever-and when these costs are taken into account the
resource user is likely to find it rational to stop adding animals
or chasing fish long before the last fish or blade of grass
remains; it may even be optimal to exploit the resource stock
at a lower rate than its maximum sustainable yield would
allow.
(iii) The state is not the only way to control resource users. Countless groups around the world have successfully regulated
access to and their members' use of common pool resources
without recourse to the state or any third party-and without
privatizing the resource. (Community, I would argue, is what
enabled them to do this.3) There is a large literature documenting this, and the books reviewed here all give examples. Furthermore, the state and private property are not alternativesto
one another: they are different kinds of things (one a form of
control, the other a set of rules), and a system of private property or any other property rights has to be enforced, the state
being just one of the ways of doing so. Other forms of regulation or control are available and are widely used by communities in managing their common pool resources.
(iv) Every solution, every combination of property rights and controls, has its costs. Private property rights are not costlessly
created, modified, and enforced; state regulation does not
come free; and both may have effects which it is impossible to
cost. What solution is best must surely depend to some extent
on the relative costs of the possible solutions. Hardin ignores
them. Common property regimes may make more sense than
private property when these costs are taken into account: perhaps the countless groups that have regulated (some of) their
resources as common property knew what they were doing!
And there is a growing literature documenting disastrous
attempts at control of common pool resources by states.
(Examples can be found in Bromley's book.)

3. See S. Singleton and M. Taylor, Common Property,Collective Action and Community, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4 (1992), 309-24, and M. Taylor and S. Singleton, "The Communal
Resource: Transaction Costs and the Solution of Collective Action Problems," forthcoming in
Politics and Society (June 1993).
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II

Glenn Stevenson's book, Common PropertyEconomics, gives a good
account of some of these shortcomings of Hardin's piece and of similar
failings in the work of certain property rights economists. But the book's
principal contribution, and it is a valuable contribution, is the presentation
of a series of econometric models which Stevenson estimates using a large
body of data on Swiss alpine grazing lands with a view to discovering
whether resources are protected as well in a common property regime as
they are under private property.
Before turning to this, a brief comment on his treatment (in chapter 2) of resource allocation under open access. The chapter opens with a
review of the standard economists' models, in both informal-graphical
and mathematical versions, showing that excessive inputs and overexploitation of the resource will come from existing users if further entry is
restricted and from new entrants if their entry is not restricted-from
which it follows that, if socially optimal use is to occur, access (entry) and
use (input levels) must both be limited. There follows a brief game-theoretic treatment of open access-a very odd treatment, for it relies wholly
on an unhelpful 1973 paper by H. V. Muhsam (essentially a static, nonstrategic formalization of Hardin's "tragedy" argument) and seems to be
almost wholly oblivious of the highly relevant literature of the last two
decades on repeated games. 4 (This is true of many writers on common
pool resources, but Stevenson writes, after all, as an economist and should
know better.)
Let us move on to Stevenson's study of Swiss grazing commons,
which students of common property will already have been introduced to
by Robert Netting in his fine 1981 book, BalancingOn An Alp. I give some
flavor of the scene by describing briefly the three main systems of common property rights used on the Alpen-the mountain grazing areas.
On share rights alps, entry is limited to those possessing grazing
rights, each of which allows its owner to graze one animal unit (a cow, say)
and which are transferable by sale or rental in a market, the total number
of such rights having been determined by the alp's carrying capacity. This
system therefore sets limits both to entry and to total use by those having
access.
There are also community alps, access to which is limited to those
having residence, or in some cases "citizenship" in the community or
township owning the alp. To limit pressure (the number of animals) on the
alp, users typically must be able to winter any animals they put on the alp
in the summer with hay harvested within the township.
4. For an introduction, see M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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And, third, there are Korporationalps. Access to these is restricted
to members of families with certain surnames, which define membership
in the ancient Korporations.Restrictions on the number of animals these
users can graze are based on residency; wintering of animals in the district, and "hut rights" granted by the Korporation.
For every alp there is an elaborate set of regulations governing the
rights system (access), types and numbers of allowable animals, timing of
ascent to and descent from the alp, alp maintenance (weeding, manuring,
stone and debris removal), stalling of animals, work duties (for alp maintenance, fence erection and repair, path maintenance, building repairs),
the payment of grazing fees, compensation fees (on a few alps) for adding
additional animals, fines for infractions, governance and voting, and
more. These fees and fines and the institution of the alp overseer are, says
Stevenson (p. 92), the main means of enforcement-to which I would add
the power of informal social sanctioning that is characteristic of small
communities.
Some of these common property alps are operated cooperatively
(both the grazing and the dairy operations); others are "dispersed operating unit commons," which is to say that the users have their own private
huts and stalls on the common land and carry out their own milking and
cheese- and butter-making.
Alps are also owned and operated privately, and Stevenson's most
interesting contribution is his econometric testing of the relative performance of the private versus the common property alps. Overgrazing and
underinvestment in improvement would manifest themselves in
degraded grass conditions, but in the absence of data on this, Stevenson
uses the cows' productivity, i.e. milk yields, regressing this on a dummy
variable for private versus common ownership. Of course, many other
variables-the "natural factors"-affect grass condition (e.g. elevation,
slope, exposure, soil type, labor input) and these have to be controlled for
in the regression.
This is his simple initial model, into which he later introduces a
vector of dummy variables to test for differences between the whole
gamut of rights and operating systems (including those mentioned above,
and variations on the private alps-owner-operated, rental, long-lease,
etc.). The result is called the "expanded rights model."
The data used to estimate these models are from 245 grazing areas
in the Bernese alps, on which only cows graze and milk is produced. The
results for the simple model, comparing all the private rights types
grouped together and all the commons together, suggest that private
property performs significantly better than common property with
respect to milk productivity. But, oddly, in this simple model, none of the
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natural factors significantly affect productivity. The reason, Stevenson
concludes, is that the model is a misspecification; it is too simple.
For the expanded rights model, the central result is that owneroperated private alps significantly out-perform both main types of common property. Also, rental private property does less well than owneroperated private property; but long-lease alps, or rental alps where a relationship has endured for at least 20 years, are not significantly different
from the owner-operated ones. Two of the natural factors now have significant positive effects of productivity, and the other eight have negative but
insignificant effects. This last is still a curious finding. Stevenson suggests
that the explanation for it is that the farmers adjust the number of animals
to the natural conditions on the alp, thus controlling for the natural factors
themselves, which would make them irrelevant variables in the regressions. Further testing supports this hypothesis.
What are we to conclude from all this? That private property is,
after all, "better" than common property? Unfortunately, Stevenson's
results do not support any general conclusions of this sort. He suggests a
number of cautions himself.
(i) We might think that the lower productivity on the commons is
simply the result of overgrazing (despite the controls
employed by the rights-holders). This turns out not to be so:
Stevenson's data reveal that the commons are less intensively
grazed than are the owner-operated private alps, even when
the natural factors are controlled for. (This, of course, is precisely the opposite of what Hardin predicted; but that is
because he was mistaken about what commons are.)
(ii) The models try to control for the natural factors affecting productivity. But it is possible that the measures of these factors
are inadequate or that not all of the relevant factors have been
included. And if common property is found in conditions not
controlled for, it may be that their productivity is low because
it makes no economic sense to improve them. Which leads to
(iii) The lower productivity of the commons, as revealed by
Stevenson's results, is an incomplete test of relative performance because it takes no account of costs. If the costs of commons operations are lower as well as their productivity, then
their net performance may be as good as or better than private
property, and from an economic point of view it may be that
the farmers are behaving optimally on the commons. But
Stevenson was not able to gather adequate data on cost. (That,
as he explains at pp. 232-33, is no easy task.) The result, unfortunately, is that the question of the economic efficiency of both
private property and commons is still moot. As Stevenson
says (p. 234), common property on the Swiss Alps could per-
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form just as efficiently as private property if costs were sufficiently lower, and there are obvious reasons why it might be.
It is, in any case, a remarkable fact that these common-property
alps, most of them on dry, steep, high-mountain slopes, have been productively managed under common property regimes continuously for centuries. (Records for some of them go back over 500 years.) This in itself is an
extraordinary achievement, which suggests that in some sense still to be
measured and explained, the commons have not been subject down all
these centuries to much abuse or neglect.
Despite its inconclusiveness, Stevenson's book represents a generally more sophisticated effort than is found in the other books reviewed
here. It makes a much more determined attempt to tease out causal relationships and is more aware of the problems such exercises always face
and of the ways in which his own work has fallen short. In this respect it
sets a standard which other empirical work on common property must
aim for.
III

At the heart of Elinor Ostrom's Governingthe Commons is a survey
of thirteen (or, depending on how you count them, eighteen or nineteen)
case studies of common-property management (or mismanagement) of
common pool resources (CPRs) and an effort to specify what it is that the
successful regimes have in common.
The cases fall into four groups. To convey a sense of the splendid
empirical scope of this study, it's worth describing them briefly.
(i) Cases where self-organized and self-governed institutions for
regulating the commons have been in place for a long time
(from more than 100 years to over 1,000 years): T6rbel, a Swiss
village whose members regulate common property in Alpen of
the kind studied by Stevenson, as well as communal forests,
"waste" lands, and irrigation systems; similar villages in
Japan; some irrigation systems in Southeast Spain; and a federation of nine irrigation systems in the Philippines.
(ii) Three groundwater basins underlying the Los Angeles area,
where regulatory regimes were put in place recently, on the
initiative of the users but with the help of Los Angeles county
and California state authorities, and have been so far successful.
(iii) Three cases Ostrom calls "fragile": a huge Sri Lankan irrigation scheme, Gal Oya; an inshore fishery at Port Lameron,
Nova Scotia; and an inshore fishery at Alanya, Turkey. She
deems the first "fragile" because government intervention is a
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possibility; the second because the federal government does
not recognize the users' regime and may impose its own; and
the third because, though adequate now, it fails to control
access.
(iv) A number of "failures": Fifteen groundwater basins in San
Bernardino County, California; two more inshore fisheries in
Turkey and another in Sri Lanka; and an irrigation scheme in
Sri Lanka. These are "failures" because they have either not
even managed to put a regime in place or have a set of rules
which they do not enforce.
Examining the robustly successful cases in the first group, Ostrom
finds that they all satisfy eight "design principles." By a design principle
she means "an essential element or condition that helps to account for the
success of these institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators [users] to the rules
in use" (p. 90). The eight design principles are: (1) The user-group and the
resource both have well-defined boundaries; (2) the use rules are appropriate to local conditions; (3) users can participate in rule modification; (4)
the users themselves monitor compliance or delegate it to agents accountable to them; (5) similarly for sanctioning, which is moreover graduated;
(6) users have access to low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms; (7) users
have rights to organize their own regimes independently of external governments; (8) in complex cases the regime is organized in a federal structure of "nested" layers.
Every one of these "design principles" or conditions is satisfied by
each of the cases in the first two groups: the long-enduring regimes and
the recently constructed California groundwater regimes. The three "fragile" cases in the third group satisfy all or most of the conditions, though
some only weakly (as my potted descriptions of them suggest). The cases
in the fourth group of "failures"fail to satisfy all or most of the conditions.
These results (which are summarized in Ostrom's table on p. 180)
are the main contribution of Ostrom's book and they are intriguing. They
are, however, married to no explanatory theory; and the very informal
"framework" which they lead her to lay out in her final chapter is not a
good substitute. Let me elaborate on this a little by offering, in a constructive spirit, two related criticisms of this work.
First, it is unclear what, if anything, is being explained here.
Ostrom is not yet claiming, she says, that the "design principles" are necessary conditions for successful CPR management (p. 90). But what is
their explanatory status? Many of them seem to be either features or consequences of successful solutions to CPR problems, not causes of them.
They perhaps form a partial answer to the question, Why do certain
regimes work? or, Why are these regimes solutions? They do not, it seems
to me, provide an explanation of why some groups of users are able to
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solve their own CPR problems endogenously-without external helpand other groups are not, which is the question with which Ostrom begins
(p. 29). To answer this question we'd need, among other things, to explain
why the successful groups were able to monitor themselves and why
endogenous sanctioning is successful and sufficient. And to answer this
question we need, e.g., to ask, What is it about a group of users (of a given
CPR) that explains why the solution (a solution satisfying Ostrom's
"design principles") works?
For this purpose, Ostrom's own analysis is a bit misleading. The
California groundwater cases of group (ii) are "successes" all right, but
differ from the long-enduring successes of group (i) in that the California
user-groups did not resolve their problems without recourse to external
agencies (Ostrom herself notes this, at p. 212). And two of the group (iii)
cases-the fisheries at Alanya and Port Lameron-should also be put with
those in group (i) inasmuch as they have resolved their problems (for the
time being) endogenously. I have (tentatively) my own explanation for why
problems wholly endogenously,
some groups are able to solve their CPR
5
but this is not the place to talk about it.
The second point I want to make is related to the first. It is that
Ostrom could have gotten more help in constructing explanations from
existing theories of cooperation. Like a number of others who have written about common pool resources, she seems to believe in particular that
the rational choice theory of collective action is inadequate for explaining
her observations; indeed that it is inconsistent with them. She fixes (in the
first and last chapters) on "Hardin's tragedy of the commons, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and Mancur Olson's logic of collective action," which
she believes "lead to the prediction that those using such resources will
not cooperate so as to achieve collective benefits." Ignoring (as we should
have been doing for a long time) Hardin's piece, this just isn't so-if we
recognize, as we obviously should, the now vast literature on repeatedPrisoners' Dilemmas (not to mention other games that are better models of
some CPR problems) and the fact that Olson himself allowed for (though
he had little to say about) "intermediate" groups, including those which
are part of a "federal" structure, in which strategic interaction could lead
to various outcomes, including cooperation. Olson's theory has, moreover, been greatly improved through all manner of modifications and
extensions: ideas touched on only briefly by Olson have been greatly
developed or transformed, and in some cases given expression in formal
models-including ideas on conditional cooperation, on the "federal"
solution, on political entrepreneurs, on informal social sanctions, on reputation, on the creation by the players themselves of norms or sanctioning
5. See the works cited in footnote 3.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

systems, and so on. All of these developments are in my view applicable
to Ostrom's materials, but she makes no serious use of them.
It may be argued that Ostrom's principal goal is to give good
advice to politicians, bureaucrats, and the resource-users themselves
about the management of CPR resources, not to construct explanatory theory. But without confidence that we have got the causal relationships
right, how can we offer good advice? (Even Stevenson, after his admirable
attempt to tease out causal connections from a great mass of quantitative
data, is at the end still unable to offer advice to the Swiss farmers about the
basic question of which property rights they should adopt.)
IV
Gary Libecap's book, Contractingfor PropertyRights, is rather different from the previous two, though much of it, too, is about common
pool resources. It is about attempts to define or to modify property
rights-that is what he means by "contracting for property rights"-so as
to capture (in three of his four cases at least) the gains from cooperation to
be had where there are common pool losses. This includes "both private
bargaining to assign or adjust informal ownership arrangements and
lobby efforts among private claimants, politicians, and bureaucrats to
define, administer, and modify more formal property institutions" (p. 11).
The chief obstacle to the success of such attempts seems in his view to be
the great difficulty of overcoming the distributional conflicts that are typically thrown up by attempts to change property rights: "the heart of the
contracting problem is devising politically acceptable allocation mechanisms to assign the gains from institutional change while maintaining its
production advantages" (p. 5).
(We might say that such distributionalproblems are for Libecap the
main source of transactioncosts that must be met if new property rights are
to be put in place. But-oddly, in view of his intellectual sources-he has
almost nothing to say about transaction costs. The languageof transaction
costs may very well be dispensable, but it does, I think, serve to remind us
that there are usually several different sources of costly impediments to
contracting.)
The bulk of the book consists of four case studies, which I will
turn to shortly. Libecap views all four cases as equally involving common
pool problems (p. 10), a view I find a little misleading in the second case,
which involves efforts by ranchers and timber companies to secure title to
large acreages of federal range land and Pacific Northwest forests: more
on this later. The cases are approached using a (more or less) common
"analytical framework." To begin with, he assumes, each party to bargaining over proposed property rights will not support change unless the
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change will enhance its welfare, and in general it will aim for a regime
under which its expected income is maximized. Even if every party could
be made better off, not all of them may be certain that he or she will gain;
and even if all do expect to gain, conflicts over the distribution of gains
may impede agreement on change.
One situation where mutual gains can be made is of course that of
the users of a common pool resource who are currently dissipating rent
because they are not properly controlling access to and/or use of the
resource. To regulate access and use is to modify property rights. The
prospect of capturing a (larger) share of these gains from cooperation provides a motive to change the existing property rights. This may involve
lobbying of and action by third parties-politicians, bureaucrats, and governments. Libecap seems to believe that, in contemporary conditions, it
always will (p. 16); but this is to neglect the possibility and, even in contemporary conditions, the reality of second-party or decentralized, nonstate bargaining and enforcement of contracts-which requires, I would
6
argue, some minimum of community among the bargaining parties.
Whether or not third parties are involved, Libecap's conclusion is
that the prospects for changing property rights so as to capture the gains
from cooperation are likely to be affected by five factors. Success is more
likely (1) the greater the anticipated aggregate gains from the change, and
less likely (2) the larger the number of bargaining parties, (3) the more heterogeneous they are (in production costs, size, wealth, political experience), and (4) the more they diverge in their assessments of the values of
their positions before and after the change ("information asymmetries")because these last three factors intensify distributional conflicts. The prospects for change are also affected by (5)the concentration of wealth under
the current and proposed property rights: concentrated wealth is likely
(says Libecap) to call forth political opposition to change but also political
pressure for redistribution, which politicians may take advantage of by
building support among the many who could benefit from the change.
How do these propositions fare with the four case studies? The
first of the cases-which Libecap sees as a benchmark for the remaining
cases (though I'm not sure he should: see below)-is about the successful
attempts by miners in the California and Nevada gold-and-silver-rush of
the second half of the nineteenth century to agree on and enforce property
rights within each mining camp, essentially in the absence of the state, and
subsequently to secure new state and federal laws recognizing their contracts. In the initial situation of open access to unsettled and previously
6. See R. C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); J. L. Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn, and S. M. Maser, A
BargainingTheory Approach to Default Provisionsand DisclosureRules in ContractLaw, Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 12 (1989), 639-709; and the works cited in footnote 3.
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unclaimed mineral land, with no legal rules to constrain the miners and
only such defacto regulation as they themselves could devise, the potential
for common pool losses, including resources wasted on protecting their
claims, was obvious. Their response was to create mining camp governments, which devised rules for the recognition and enforcement of private
mineral rights and the mediation of disputes. Later the mining industry
and western politicians secured federal and state recognition of these
property rules. All this was rapidly achieved, as Libecap's propositions
predict, because (1)the aggregate gains from such cooperation were large;
(2) the parties were few (20-30 in each early mining camp) and (3) homogeneous (in race, culture, skill, technology) and there were no competing
non-mining interests to be reconciled; (4) there were no critical information asymmetries among the miners; and (5) all the parties equally
expected to gain from the creation of property rights: the miners were initially in a sort of Rawlsian original position.
Libecap's second case concerns what he seems to want us to
believe was a similar case, in which there were efforts (in the late nineteenth century) to obtain formal recognition of informal "local property
rights arrangements," in this case to federal range land in the arid west,
and to modify existing laws concerning federal timber land in the Pacific
Northwest. The laws (the Preemption Act, the Homestead Act, and the
Timber and Stone Law) allowed for individual claims of only 160 acres.
That acreage may have been insufficient for a livelihood in the arid west,
and the forested land in the Northwest was no doubt unsuited to farming.
That was certainly the view of the ranchers who before 1880 had made
and enforced their own local property rights arrangements on the range
land they helped themselves to and of the timber companies which tried
to secure title to large areas by illegally making use of "entrymen," who
claimed 160-acre tracts and turned over the titles to the companies. After
1880, increasing settlement rendered the ranchers' rules insufficient, and
better enforcement of federal law obstructed the timber companies' methods. The two groups therefore sought changes in the laws.
Libecap now tells us that in each of these two groups there were
"potential common pool losses from insecure tenure" and that: "Efficient
lumber operations.., required both secure property rights to support the
fixed-capital investments [of the timber companies] and large amounts of
timber land for production" (p. 53). In other words, ranchers and timber
companies, who had illegally acquired the use of large tracts of land,
"needed" to keep it, with secure title. Only with secure private title, it was
argued (by, among others, the commissioner of the General Land Office),
would the rapid deforestation of the western forests be averted. Moreover,
the fraud practiced by the timber companies was a costly means of gaining title, which represented in Libecap's view a "dissipation of rent" (pp.
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55-59). This is Libecap's only judgment on what was, after all, a land grab
by the few (and moreover by actors whose later behavior should give
pause to those who subscribe to the view that conservation of natural
resources is best served by private property rights). It is true that the
ranchers and timber companies were trying to establish secure property
rights, without which there would be inefficient use of the resource. But
that is clearly not all they were trying to do. Neither of these two sub-cases
wholly resembles the other cases.
That these efforts of ranchers and timber companies to change
federal laws met with an unfriendly reception is hardly surprising. This is
predicted by Libecap's propositions: in particular, the vested interests
were many and heterogeneous; the distributional pressures had greatly
increased as claimable unallocated federal land shrank; and the gains
from the proposed land law changes were uncertain and disputed.
A final comment on Libecap's treatment of this case. He seems to
take it for granted that it was the establishment of private property rights
in range and timber lands that was needed to solve the problems of common pool losses. The other three books reviewed here stand as warnings
that he shouldn't. He could learn, in particular, from Stevenson's more
cautious worrying about the difficulties of comparing the economic performance of grazing land under different forms of property rights. Nothing Libecap says establishes that private property rights must be the
solution. Nor does he establish the case for large private holdings in
Pacific Northwest timberland, a case that is far from easy to make.
Libecap's third case concerns fisheries. The common pool problems of fisheries are well known: without regulation, an open access fishery is liable to attract too many fishermen, too much capital investment
(boats, gear), too much labor, and so on, with the result that catches and
incomes decline. The solution in many inshore local fisheries around the
world has been a regime of common property, in which the fishermen
themselves limit entry and regulate harvesting in various ways. Libecap
recognizes this possibility, but after an exceedingly cursory consideration
of a handful of such regimes, concludes that they are rarely viable. (For
more on this, see Ostrom's book, reviewed above.) For some reason he
sees the fisheries' regimes run by unions and trade associations, which
limited access and partially regulated harvesting through price agreements with buyers before being dismantled by the federal government, as
alternatives to common property (p. 87), whereas it seems to me that some
of these 7regimes had some of the characteristics of common property
regimes.

7. Compare A. F McEvoy, The Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the California
Fisheries, 1850-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
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The only fisheries example Libecap offers in support of his own
argument is that of the Texas shrimp fishery. Here there has been some
limited contracting to regulate harvest but the decline in catch per effort
has apparently not been large enough to have caused the shrimpers, regulators, and politicians to agree on the more restrictive regulations that efficiency would indicate. As in other United States fisheries, according to
Libecap, this is because of distributional conflicts caused by heterogeneities of skill, equipment, etc., information asymmetries about fish stocks,
and doubts by some fishermen that they would gain by further restrictions.
The fourth and final case study is of common-pool problems in
United States oil fields. Here we see competitive pumping races, in which
each firm tries to extract as much oil as it can as fast as possible, draining
oil from under its neighbors' holdings and hoping to benefit from the
lower cost of extraction that exists before the oil field's pressure is lowered
as the oil is drained. All those with rights to extract oil from a field would
be better off in the aggregate if they drilled fewer wells and extracted the
oil more slowly, which would enable more to be extracted and at lower
cost, and would require less investment in construction of surface storage
facilities. This of course requires collective action. The revenues that have
been lost from past failures of collective action have been enormous: they
were estimated to be (in 1914, e.g.) $50 million when the total value of
United States production was $214 million, and only 20-25 percent of the
oil was reckoned to be recoverable compared with an estimated 85-90 percent under controlled withdrawal (p. 94). On top of this, rapid production
unnecessarily depressed prices on the market.
The recognized solution to this collective action problem is unitization, in which all production in an oil field is carried out by a single firm,
with revenues apportioned by agreement to all those with drilling rights
on the field. But few oil fields have been unitized until late in their development, when the gains are much greater. Distributional conflict has,
again, been the main reason. Agreement on a formula for sharing the proceeds of production has not been forthcoming, and this is (as Libecap predicts) because the parties are too heterogeneous (with respect to size and
the value of their leases, inter alia) and too asymmetric in their valuations
of each others' leases (on which revenue shares would be based), and are
too uncertain about what they would get out of unitization. These same
differences have also generally impeded the creation of unified support
for efforts by politicians and by some of the oil producers themselves and
their associations to produce legislation compelling unitization.
Libecap has given us a most valuable and sometimes fascinating
addition to our knowledge of common pool resources. But this book is
some way from providing a full or systematic treatment of these things.
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Even leaving aside distributional and other ethical issues (like most economists, Libecap seems to believe that efficiency is the only consideration),
there is a failure to consider the whole range of sources of transaction costs
and of what it is that tends to lower them and otherwise enable groups to
meet them, and a failure also to consider all the possible property regimes:
size and the heterogeneities and asymmetries that Libecap considers are
not the only factors affecting the prospects for successful contracting, 8 and
private property rights are not the only arrangements that can stop common pool losses.
V
The four case studies that make up the bulk of Libecap's book are
the subjects of journal articles previously published by Libecap and his
collaborators. But the book is not just a collection of disparate essays; it
sustains a single argument, has a clear thrust. Not so Daniel Bromley's
book. Five of its ten chapters are versions of previously published pieces,
and they and the additional material do not join together to make a unified whole. The book lacks structure and sustained argument. Bromley's
aim, he says, is "to offer an operational theory of rights, property, and
property rights with the intent of informing economic analysis and public
debate about natural resources and environmental problems" (p. 8). This
he does not do. He gives a number of conceptual discussions: of property
and the various sorts of property rights regimes (environmental policy, he
rightly observes, is essentially about what property rights structures are to
prevail); of property rules, liability rules and inalienability rules; of the
many different kinds of externalities (technical, pecuniary, (infra-) marginal, Pareto-(ir)relevant, and so on); of transaction costs and the sources
of market failure. But no integrated theory is constructed from these materials, and many of the conceptual distinctions he is at pains to draw are
put to no use in the discussions that follow.
He does, however, do a fairly good job of pulling together the criticisms that have been made of Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"-which is where we began this essay. And he provides good
discussions of common property solutions in action and of colonial and
post-Colonial government policies that have often destroyed them. These
policies encouraged the rapid exploitation of natural resources to earn foreign exchange and the introduction of mechanized export agricultures9
that led to migration and increased pressure on fragile soils elsewhere.
8. See the works cited in footnote 6.
9. On this, see also especially Piers Blaikie, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries (London: Longman, 1985), and Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, Land
Degradation and Society (London: Methuen, 1987).
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They also undermined the indigenous common property rights and other
institutions, local and national, which enabled many communities all over
the developing world to manage natural resources successfully. This latter, he argues, is the real tragedy of the commons.
Bromley also takes up the central question tackled in Stevenson's
book: whether (as many economists have believed) private property in
land is more conducive to productivity than common property. The problem, as Stevenson saw (in his much fuller discussion), is that observing a
high correlation between productivity and the property regime is in itself
inconclusive. For one thing, it is the land that is of poorer quality-for reasons having nothing to do with the property rights-that tends to be managed as common property. Bromley produces the following argument
about this: as we move away from an urban center, the "land rent" falls
off, i.e. the land becomes less valuable; if it is very far away its economic
value is too low to justify any property regime; closer in, state property is
justified; closer yet the potential losses from insufficient regulation of the
increasingly valuable land calls for common property, and, closest of all to
the urban center, private property. A pattern very roughly like this is
sometimes observed; but we also find land that alternates between private
and common management (as, e.g., in parts of the European open field
systems), and then of course there are irrigation systems whose main
canals, managed as common property, run right through villages and
towns. It's surely not the distance from the city alone that explains the
property regime of choice, but a variety of factors, including the nature of
the productive activity itself. For some discussion of this question, the
reader can consult Robert Netting's Balancing On An Alp (especially at pp.
64-69), Carl Dahlman's The Open Field System and Beyond (passim), and
Stevenson's book, reviewed here (especially at pp. 190-92). 10
VI
I have found something to criticize in each of these four books.
But all of them contribute something to our understanding of the problems of common pool resources. All of them should be read by anyone
who still cites Hardin with approval or who thinks only of privatization
and the state when contemplating possible solutions to environmental
and natural resource problems. At stake is the welfare of millions of
resource users the world over and perhaps the survival of us all.
10. R. McC. Netting, Balancing On An Alp: Ecological Change and Continuity in a Swiss
Mountain Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); C. J. Dahlman, The
Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

